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Introduction
In 1856, John McLeod Campbell published his magnum opus, The 
Nature of the Atonement. The book offered a highly distinctive 
treatment of the doctrine of the atonement, and has proven to be one of 
the most influential in the history of the Reformed church, particularly 
in Scotland. The central tenets of his theory – the universal scope of 
the atonement and the importance of the assurance of faith – are now 
so broadly accepted that it is strange to think of them as ever having 
been considered dangerous and even heretical, as they clearly were at 
the time of his deposition from the ordained ministry of the Church 
of Scotland in May 1831. Nevertheless, another aspect of McLeod 
Campbell’s theory – his treatment of the role of the suffering of Jesus 
Christ in the atonement – remains a subject of greater theological 
contention. 
This paper considers the atonement in the theology of John McLeod 
Campbell with particular emphasis on this matter of the role of the 
suffering of Christ. It begins by offering a brief outline of his doctrine 
of the atonement, before moving to consider in detail the nature and 
purpose of the sufferings of Christ within it. The paper proceeds in a 
final section to consider potential weaknesses of McLeod Campbell’s 
theory in this connection under three headings: the purpose of the 
sufferings of Christ, the cause of the cry of dereliction, and the logical 
ordering of the atonement.
The Atonement in the Theology of John McLeod Campbell
In his work on the atonement, John McLeod Campbell determines to 
let the subject matter speak for itself: “… it is in the way of studying 




to have been, that I propose to proceed in seeking positive conclusions 
as to its nature, its expiatory virtue, and its adequacy to all the ends 
contemplated.”1
Out of this seeking, influenced by the experience of his own parish 
ministry, there emerges a theory that differs considerably from the 
penal substitution theory laid down by the Westminster Confession of 
Faith and accepted by the majority of the clergy of his day. 
On the one hand, there remain certain continuities between the two 
theories: in both cases, God reveals not only “the evil of our condition 
as sinners” and “the measure of our own capacity of good”, but also 
“the way in which the desire which arose in God, as the Father of 
spirits, to bridge over that gulf, has been accomplished” (37). There is 
similarly little room for disagreement when McLeod Campbell writes 
that “the essence and substance of the atonement” is “[T]he will of 
God which the Son of God came to do and did … being … the offering 
of the body of Christ once for all” (111). 
On the other hand, there have also been fundamental shifts in material 
and emphasis. First, for McLeod Campbell, it is the revelation that 
God is a loving Father which characterises the human relationship 
with God, for “[T]he foundation of every counsel is our filial relation 
to God” (185). While God remains both Lawgiver and Judge, the 
relationship of humanity to God is not, as in certain theories of penal 
substitution, “a legal standing, however high or perfect, but a filial 
standing, … which is given to us in Christ” (76), and it is to this 
“personal relation to God as the Father of our spirits that the atonement 
belongs” (34). Second, and consequently, McLeod Campbell believes 
that the atonement was not limited to an elect, but was universal, 
“having reference to all mankind” (35).2 A limited atonement would 
ultimately present the justice of God as necessary, but the love and 
mercy and grace of God as arbitrary (73-74), rendering the work of 
Christ to be “no longer a revelation of the name of God, no longer a 
work revealing that God is love” (73). It would offer no real basis for 
the believer’s assurance of faith or personal appropriation of Christ 
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(72). By contrast, the atonement was seen by McLeod Campbell 
to reveal the love of God, to which God’s holiness and wrath were 
subordinate, and to offer the faithful believer a genuine assurance that 
“the Father will be well pleased in us” (140). 
The theory of the atonement of McLeod Campbell has two diachronic 
aspects: “the one retrospective, referring to the evil from which that 
grace brings deliverance; the other prospective, referring to the good 
which it bestows” (37). The retrospective aspect of the atonement 
pertains to the life, death, and resurrection of Christ, and comprises 
two distinguishable acts of Christ. On the humanward side, Christ 
deals with humanity on the part of God, bearing perfect witness to the 
excellence and trustworthiness of God and the unchanging character of 
God’s love (114). On the Godward side, Christ mediates with God on 
the part of humanity, satisfying divine justice by dealing with the divine 
condemnation of and wrath against human sin (117). The prospective 
aspect of the atonement similarly comprises two directions of activity. 
First, Christ reveals the heart of the Father to humanity so that “we 
may see how sin … has made us as orphans, and understand that the 
grace of God … restores to our orphan spirits their Father and to the 
Father of spirits His lost children” (139). Second, Christ intercedes 
with the Father on behalf of humanity, pleading His own merits that 
they might receive remission of sins and eternal life (141). 
The Sufferings of Christ in the Atonement Doctrine of John 
McLeod Campbell
With this overview of McLeod Campbell’s doctrine of the atonement 
in place, it is now time to turn to the place of the sufferings of Christ 
within this theory. In writing against the penal substitution theory of 
the atonement, the key issue for John McLeod Campbell is stated thus: 
“… was it the pain as pain, and as a penal infliction, or was it the pain 
as a condition and form of holiness and love under the pressure of 
our sin and its consequent misery, that is presented to our faith as the 
essence of the sacrifice and its atoning virtue?” (107).  
T
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This section examines how McLeod Campbell construes the sufferings 
of Christ under the latter category, and proceeds under two headings: 
first, the nature of the sufferings of Christ; and second, the role of 
these sufferings in the atonement.
The Nature of the Sufferings of Christ
For McLeod Campbell, the intensity of the sufferings of Christ are 
“according to the perfection of the divine mind in the sufferer, and the 
capacity of suffering which is in suffering flesh” (120). This lifelong 
sacrifice results from Christ’s witnessing in the flesh to the unchanging 
love of God, for in doing so, the pressure of the sin of humanity and 
the enmity of humanity to God are brought to bear on His spirit (114). 
In this suffering, He sees sin and sinners with the eyes of God and 
feels the resultant burden in the heart of God (107).  
In the last days of the life of Christ, God lets the power of evil have its 
course (190), and subjects Christ “to the trial of the hour and power 
of darkness” (207). The consequent sufferings of Christ involve the 
“patient endurance of all the full and perfected development of the 
enmity which the faithfulness of the previous testimony for the Father’s 
name had awakened” (183). This manifestation of a perfect sympathy 
with the Father’s righteous condemnation of sin is ultimately perfected 
in His suffering and death (115-116), which are “necessary to the 
perfection of His witness-bearing for the Father” (116). Throughout, 
Christ manifests the power, the courage, and the forgiveness of love 
(198), in an unbroken continuity of relationship with God (192).
It is thus impossible, for McLeod Campbell, to regard the sufferings of 
Christ as penal, for there is a need to distinguish “… penal sufferings 
endured in meeting a demand of divine justice, and sufferings which 
are themselves the expression of the divine mind regarding our sins, 
and a manifestation by the Son of what our sins are to the Father’s 
heart.” (116)
It is this latter concept which is relevant here: the sufferings of Christ 
are not a form of punishment, but reveal the agony of the holiness and 
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love of God in the face of the evil of sin and the misery of sinners (107). 
McLeod Campbell thus distinguishes carefully between “an atoning 
sacrifice for sin and the enduring as a substitute the punishment due 
to sin” (107). 
The Purpose of the Sufferings of Christ
McLeod Campbell writes that it is the divine mind in humanity, present 
in Christ, “which did suffer sufferings of a nature and virtue to purge 
our sins” (121). It was, for him, “the spiritual essence and nature of the 
sufferings of Christ, and not that these sufferings were penal, which 
constituted their value as entering into the atonement” (108). Thus far, 
however, the only reason for the crucifixion of Christ seems to be that 
of perfectly revealing the love of God. 
There is here another dimension to the suffering of Christ, however, 
for McLeod Campbell notes that there is on the cross “a perfect 
confession of our sins … a perfect Amen in humanity to the judgment 
of God on the sin of man” (118). Christ can offer a perfect confession 
on behalf of humanity, because He is “in our nature and our true 
brother” (120). In this act, the divine righteousness of Christ as human 
in His confession of human sin meets the divine righteousness of 
God in His condemnation of human sin, and the righteousness of 
the offended justice of God is satisfied (122). In his death, therefore, 
Christ honours both “the sentence of the law … [and] the mind of God 
which that sentence expressed” (216). The sufferings of Christ on the 
cross are the perfecting of the work of redemption of God, not only 
as the perfecting of the witnessing of Christ to God, but also as the 
perfecting of the confession of humanity before God (158). 
In his presentation of the atonement, McLeod Campbell frequently 
incorporates language and ideas that are also found in the theory of 
penal substitution, but transforms the way in which they are used. For 
example, he acknowledges that “Christ … must be conceived of as 
dealing with the righteous wrath of God against sin” (117). However, 
while that wrath is present to and relevant for Christ, the atoning 
sacrifice that Christ offers in respect to it occurs in the form of a perfect 
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confession (118), rather than by way of imputation of human guilt 
and penal infliction for human sin (119-120). Furthermore, McLeod 
Campbell writes of Christ as “the propitiation for our sins as He is the 
way into the holiest” (154). His death as this propitiation is, however, 
seen as a moral and spiritual sacrifice for sin, a death neither as a 
substitute for humanity – “otherwise He alone would have died” – nor 
as a punishment – “for … death had to Him no sting” (217). Finally, 
McLeod Campbell can write that “[T]he Father’s heart did demand 
an atoning sacrifice … [and] the shedding of blood in order to the 
remission of sins” (147). However, the underlying reason is spiritual 
and not penal: that “justice would be rendered to the fatherliness which 
had been sinned against” (147). It is no surprise that, confronted by 
this attempt to hold together the concepts and terminology of divine 
judgement and heavenly fatherhood, Eugene Bewkes refers to the 
“contortions of language occasioned.”3
Ultimately, for McLeod Campbell, the true sufferings of Christ are 
“a moral and spiritual sacrifice, to which the [penal] sufferings were 
related only as involved in the fulness and perfection of the sacrifice” 
(191). This moral and spiritual atonement is “infinitely more adequate 
to the results accomplished, because infinitely more honouring to the 
law of God” (158).
A Critique of the Atonement Doctrine of John McLeod Campbell
The critique of McLeod Campbell’s treatment of the doctrine of 
the atonement here will focus on three aspects: the purpose of the 
sufferings of Christ, the cry of desolation on the cross, and the logical 
ordering of the atonement.
The Purpose of the Sufferings of Christ
The fundamental question which arises in the context of McLeod 
Campbell’s theory concerns the purpose served by the physical 
sufferings and the crucifixion of Christ. For it would appear that the 
physical sufferings are not intrinsically redemptive: rather they in 
some way offer a perfection of the already present manifestation of the 
T
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love of God for humanity and the already present perfect confession to 
God of the sin of humanity. However, this conceptualisation raises two 
problems. First, it suggests that the prior manifestation and confession 
of Christ were somehow less than perfect (116), and in need of some 
sort of ‘development’ through external circumstances. Second, if the 
sufferings of Christ are an expression of the fatherly divine mind 
regarding the sins of humanity (106), it seems difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that the expression of the divine mind (or heart) in regard 
to sin is one which invokes pain and/or punishment. These problems 
remain even if one agrees that the spiritual and moral sufferings of 
Christ are greater and more important than any judicial or physical 
sufferings. 
Thomas F. Torrance argues in McLeod Campbell’s defence that the 
latter was engaged in a “recasting of the notion of the traditional notion 
of ‘penal suffering’;”4 that the latter “never hesitated to speak of the 
divine punishment of sin;”5 and that “[T]he penal element as infliction 
under the wrath of God … was by no means rejected but discerned in 
a deeper dimension.”6 McLeod Campbell certainly radically recasts 
the Calvinist doctrine which he inherited, and always acknowledges 
the link between sin and wrath (117), a link which, one must note, 
is inapplicable in direct form to Christ without some notion of the 
transference of sin. However, it would seem that the agony caused by 
the presence of sin in the face of holiness, which Christ experiences 
(107), is exactly what McLeod Campbell wishes to avoid describing 
in terms of punishment. For McLeod Campbell, Christ does indeed 
realise and confront the full wrath of God against sin, but not as 
the bearer or recipient of a punishment, for (in the absence of any 
imputation of creaturely sin) it cannot and does not come against Him 
personally. It seems therefore slightly misleading for Torrance to talk 
of the presence in McLeod Campbell’s theory of the atonement of 
any direct penal dimension, let alone one of a “fuller and profounder 
kind.”7 Trevor A. Hart is surely more correct to note simply that 
McLeod Campbell “reject[s] a penal interpretation of the Cross.”8 To 
attempt to distinguish between a penal element which is here present 
and a concept of punishment which is here absent, as Torrance appears 
to do in a manner opposed to McLeod Campbell’s own work,9 seems 
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to depend on rather arbitrary definitions of ‘penal’ and ‘punishment’. 
It is perhaps neither semantically accurate nor finally convincing.
McLeod Campbell is surely right to recognise the importance in the 
atonement of the identity of the One who suffers and His relation to 
those for whose sins He suffers (105). However, when confronted with 
the question of what divine purpose within that redemption it serves 
to impose sufferings on Christ, he simply argues that “it has appeared 
to the divine wisdom necessary to subject His [Christ’s] love and trust 
towards the Father … to the trial of the hour and power of darkness” 
(207). He is less forthcoming, however, on what purpose it serves in 
this trial to enjoin physical suffering to manifest perfectly something 
(the perfect love of God) that has been true since the beginning of 
time, when that suffering of itself has no atoning value. In his enduring 
insistence that the sufferings and death of Christ are necessary to 
satisfy the Law, while simultaneously maintaining the primacy of 
the love of the Father, McLeod Campbell ultimately risks the Law 
becoming divorced from the Father.10 It is as if, as Leanne van Dyk 
notes, “the atonement and Christ’s sufferings refer to quite different 
realities.”11 McLeod Campbell wants to retain the significance of the 
cross, yet when his theory is deconstructed, he appears to be at a loss 
to suggest what role the physical sufferings play in it. 
McLeod Campbell’s spiritualisation of the whole concept of the blood 
of Christ is further evidence of this thesis, relating it as he does to 
the purging of the believer’s conscience and away from the actual 
physical sufferings of Christ. He argues explicitly for a strictly moral 
and spiritual relation between the sacrifice of Christ and the worship 
in which it permits believers to participate (144). In the cross of 
McLeod Campbell, human sin is expiated by the perfect repentance 
and confession of Christ (118), and it is through the death of Christ 
in the perfection of this act that the power of death and the holder of 
that power – the devil – are destroyed (193). However, in contrast to 
the biblical witness,12 the physical aspect of sin as an enslaving evil is 
perhaps afforded insufficient attention. This results in a dangerously 
noetic emphasis to the atonement, precisely because it is not the case 
that sin is taken up in the flesh of Christ, overcome, and destroyed. As 
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Thomas Hywel Hughes suggests, merely to see sin from the point of 
view of God seems not to address sin as a power in the flesh and in 
the soul.13 
It seems difficult therefore to avoid the conclusion that for McLeod 
Campbell, the physical sufferings on the cross are evidence of nothing 
more than that Jesus of Nazareth had a bad day in Jerusalem and 
that sufficient enmity toward Him existed to effect his torture and 
crucifixion. Both these possibilities are empirically true, but over and 
above any exemplary status, neither of these possibilities would seem 
to have any atoning value: nor, in the theory of McLeod Campbell, 
would the physical sufferings of Christ. It is thus no surprise that van 
Dyk concludes that in searching for justification for the sufferings of 
Christ, McLeod Campbell ultimately resorts to the “secret mysteries 
of the divine counsel.”14 
The Cry of Desolation on the Cross
The focus on the unbroken testimony which Christ manifested to the 
Father throughout his suffering is evidence of a strong Trinitarian 
focus in McLeod Campbell’s doctrine of the atonement. In considering 
the cry of desolation from the cross – “My God, my God, why have 
you forsaken me?” (Matthew 27.46) – McLeod Campbell therefore 
appeals heuristically to the remaining verses of the underlying Psalm 
22. He asserts that they illustrate and confirm “the Sufferer’s unbroken 
trust – the clearing up of God’s faithfulness and truth in the whole 
transaction” (202). There is thus no suggestion that Christ “tasted 
death under the Father’s wrath” (203). Instead, in order that sinners 
also might trust in the Father and be saved, Christ “perfects His 
glorifying of the Father’s Name, by being seen trusting in that Name 
alone when brought into the extremest need of a sure hold on God” 
(206). However, this interpretation of the cry of dereliction raises two 
important questions. 
The first is the exegetical question: how persuasive is McLeod 
Campbell’s treatment of this verse? On the one hand, he has consistently 
referred to the strength of the bond between Father and Son: one sees 
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the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ (36); the Son comes to 
do the Father’s will (228); the Son shares the Father’s grief over the 
sinfulness of humanity (120). It is clear how little McLeod Campbell 
would wish to separate Father and Son even on the cross, and how 
the risk of Nestorianism or tritheism in doing so would be a spectre 
on any theological horizon.15 On the other hand, to neglect the verse 
of despair and abandonment at the beginning of the psalm, in favour 
of prioritising the verses of consolation toward the end of the psalm, 
is a radical move. It fails adequately to perceive that, as George M. 
Tuttle observes, “[T]he cry does express a feeling of utter desolation, 
a sense of abandonment and an experience of defeat … [which] is 
temporary but real.”16 Moreover, as Hart recognises, it would seem 
possible to distinguish between an actual God-forsakenness and the 
incarnate Son’s human experience of God-forsakenness.17 McLeod 
Campbell, with the best of intentions, appears to do less than justice 
to this paradigmatic example of the paradoxical and simultaneous 
presence and absence of God. 
The second question concerns the pastoral validity of this exegesis: 
what comfort now can Christ offer the believer when God appears 
to the believer to be absent? If Christ never experienced in any way 
either the feeling of the profound absence of God or the feeling of 
sinful inadequacy before God, it is difficult to reflect what comfort 
could be offered to the concerned believer who felt distant from God. 
In a theological sense, arguing from pastoral practice to scriptural 
exegesis is entirely the wrong way around. Yet in another sense, this 
is a particularly valid line of questioning for McLeod Campbell, given 
the prioritising of the experience of the Christian believer which 
precipitated his own initial theological awakenings in the parish 
ministry. 
The Ordering of the Atonement
It has been noted already that McLeod Campbell was keen to 
assert the primacy of the character of God as a Father. However, 
his overwhelming desire to stress this aspect of the divine-human 
relationship leads him to the brink of self-contradiction. On the one 
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hand, he writes that if God provides the means of atonement, “then 
forgiveness must precede atonement; and the atonement must be the 
form of the manifestation of the forgiving love of God, not its cause” 
(45). This would seem to reduce the cross to a mere illustration for 
the benefit of humanity. On the other hand, he posits the “moral and 
spiritual impossibility of our returning to the Father of our spirits, 
except on such a path as this which Christ has opened for us through 
the rent veil of His flesh” (147). This seems on the contrary to imply 
that the atonement is a necessary precursor to forgiveness.
In attempting to make sense of McLeod Campbell at this point, it is 
useful to consider briefly the context of the first chapter, in which he 
argues that forgiveness must precede atonement. His purpose there is 
to assess the ends contemplated in the atonement, and to demonstrate 
the proactive and pre-existent ability and desire of God to bridge 
the gulf between human potential and human sinfulness. “The first 
demand,” McLeod Campbell argues, “which the gospel makes upon us 
in relation to the atonement is, that we believe that there is forgiveness 
with God” (44). He defines forgiveness, however, as a “love to an 
enemy surviving his enmity … which … can act towards him for his 
good” (45). This might suggest therefore that rather than forgiveness 
itself being present prior to the atonement, there is a potential for 
forgiveness which exists in the love of God prior to the atonement. 
Even if this sympathetic reading were true, it is clear that McLeod 
Campbell leaves himself open to grave misunderstanding at this point. 
It is therefore no surprise to find that Gerrish comments on “a certain 
reprehensible obstinacy in Campbell’s refusal to surrender unfamiliar 
language even when he saw that it misled.”18
At stake here is the ordering and necessity of the divine plan: McLeod 
Campbell argues that the scriptures portray “the love of God as the 
cause, and the atonement as the effect” (46), and acknowledges that 
redemption has been “the divine purpose from the beginning” (23). 
However, by arguing that forgiveness precedes atonement, rather than 
that the desire to forgive precedes the atonement, he risks rendering 
the atonement itself superfluous. There would be little need for the 
event of the cross of Christ, after all, if forgiveness were already to 
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have taken place. It is true that McLeod Campbell acknowledges the 
need for the atonement to satisfy the divine wrath that righteously 
condemns sin (117). However, his desire to privilege a filial conception 
of the atonement in opposition to (rather than as a complementary 
aspect to) a legal conception leads him here to the brink of apparent 
inconsistency. 
Conclusion
The theory of the atonement presented by John McLeod Campbell 
in The Nature of the Atonement has many strengths. Its corrective 
stand against the legalistic impulses of nineteenth-century Calvinism, 
its strong emphasis on the love of the Father and of the Son – for 
each other and for humanity as a whole, its evangelical desire for the 
full participation of the believer in the benefits of the atoning work of 
Christ: all these features are to be welcomed. As James C. Goodloe 
has observed, “Campbell effected a remarkable reworking of his 
Reformed heritage.”19 
However, this paper has attempted to offer some insight into the 
weaknesses of McLeod Campbell’s theory apparent in his treatment 
of the passion of Christ. It has suggested that neither the sufferings 
of Christ nor the cry of dereliction from the Cross are sufficiently or 
adequately explained, and that the logical ordering at the heart of the 
theory might itself jeopardise its consistency. As John Macquarrie 
commented:
Is there, on Campbell’s view of the atonement, any necessity for 
the death of Christ? I do not clearly see that there is. … ‘Light’ 
is one of the most frequently recurring words in Campbell’s 
writing, but whether he deals adequately with darkness and 
death is open to question.20
None of this is to desire to return uncritically to the particular Calvinist 
doctrine of penal substitution that McLeod Campbell opposed: rather 
it is to recognise that there may actually remain a penal element in 
the atonement, which, while not the dominant feature is nonetheless 
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an important soteriological element in the divine plan of redemption. 
There must remain a degree both of mystery and of incompleteness 
in any theory of the atonement: perhaps, however, McLeod Campbell 
has a slight excess of both.
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